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INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has resulted in a global environment which is much less volatile than it has been for the past eighty years.
One major outcome of this easing of world tensions has inevitably been a significant reduction in spending for defense.
The eventual size of the reductions will vary from country to country, but they are already having a substantial impact on the defense industrial sector of a number of countries which have been engaged in weapons production, including the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially Russia and Ukraine, and the former Warsaw Pact members of Central Europe, notably Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
The major task facing these countries in light of these reductions will be the conversion of all or part of their industrial infrastructure from weapons manufacturing to the production of civilian goods. How large a task this will be and how smoothly the process goes will depend heavily on the size of each country's defense sector, and on the economic structure and political climate in which conversion takes place.
This analysis will examine the process of defense industry conversion from the perspective of certain analysts who have studied it extensively and then look at how the task is being approached in the Central European countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Some of these differences between the two sectors make economic adjustment more difficult for the defense sector than it is for civilian industry. This is especially the case in a free market economy like that of the U.S., where the degree of governmental involvement in the defense sector is vastly greater than it is in the civilian sector, and has contiibuted to behaviors in the defense sector which serve to handicap defense firms when they are forced to operate in the commercial sector.
Besides its being more closely bound to government than civilian industry, "defence production tends to be more R&D-intensive, uses a larger proportion of advanced technologies and production techniques, and employs more highly-skilled production workers, engineers and scientists." 6 Adelman and Augustine list further differences, such as lack of know-how in mass 6 marketing and in making high-volume, low unit-cost items, a nonexistent distribution network, little knowledge of consumer tastes, market research, or how to price to compete in the commercial marketplace.
All of these factors make the transition from the defense sector to civilian production more difficult than moving from one part of the civilian economy to another, no matter what economic system is in place. These factors have their most serious effect on the mobility of defense workers, whose skills, because they are so specialized, are not easily adaptable to civilian production. These same factors also have an impact on the defense companies whose technologies and production techniques which are not easily transferable to civilian production.
Jacques Ganslers identifies a whole series of additional differences between the two sectors which are particularly prominent in a free market economy. Among these differences are the contrast in markets, where the defense sector has a single buyer, the government, whereas the civilian sector has many potential customers. From the supply side, there are very few suppliers of a given item in the defense sector. These two key differences, with ill their attendant ramifications, severely diminish the competitiveness of a firm which has operated primarily in the defense industry environment. When a country's defense spending is reduced, not only is there little market for the products which the firm has been making, but it is 7 faced with trying to enter an established civilian market with new products but little experience in that market.
Leitenberg expresses somewhat of a minority view on the matter of the differences between the defense and commercial sectors.
He is not as pessimistic about the transferability of defense worker skills to the civilian sector, and believes that "there is a substantial amount of exaggeration in the view that the skills of defense industrial employees differ greatly from those producing civilian products."
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
While features inherent to the defense industry have a bearing on how it undergoes economic adjustment, the major factor which affects how the industry negotiates the passage from military to civilian production is the economic system in which it operates. This was the finding of Alexander in studying conversion experiences in the U.S., China, Japan, and the then Soviet Union, all of whom had different forms of economic structure.
The primary way in which economic systems affect the process of defense industry conversion is by determining the general focus of conversion. While most discussion of defense conversion has largely surrounded the individual plant, or establishment, 8 level, that is not necessarily where the conversion process generally takes place.
Whether it does take place primarily at that level or not is dependent on the country's economic structure. Alexander found thaL:
"the more rigid and inflexible the economic management and the more immobile the resources, the more conversion will -ind must -occur at the establishment level. Conversely, the greater the flexibility of the economic agents and the more mobile the resources, the more conversion is likely to take place in a diffused manner throughout the economy at large. Therefore, a good deal of conversion in the United States occurs through the mobility of workers and capital equipment, rather than through diversification at the establishment level."' In a centrally planned economy, the focus of conversion isalmost necessarily at the individual plant level, since the economic system does not foster the kind of resource mobility which is a prerequisite for conversion to take place in the economy at large.
This has been found to have some short-term potential, since in the planned economies, the defense sector has benefitted from preferential treatment by the government.
Consequently it has a large and technologically progressive capital stock, a well-skilled labor force, and experienced management which can be applied to civilian production. estimates that across the Soviet defense industry, the breakdown of production was about 55% defense and 45% civilian production.
This same model has generally prevailed in Central Europe, though similar distribution figures are not available.
The decision to convert the defense industries of Central
Europe to civilian production is not based solely on the reduction of defense needs resulting from the lowering of global tensions. The countries of Central Europe, specifically Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, in the aftermath of the overthrow of Communist rule, established an implicit policy goal to get out of the arms race altogether.' As will be seen, this decision has been indefinitely deferred in Czechoslovakia, at least for the short term, because of certain internal reasons.
As has been discussed above, a factor which further complicates the task of defense industry conversion in the countries of Central Europe is the fact that these countries are also undergoing radical economic transformation. Under the old economic regime, the defense industry operated within a centrally It is the contention of the Slovak government that the continued export of arms is temporarily necessary to provide needed hard currency to pay for eventual conversion.
Because of the situation in Slovakia, the country as a whole has had to adopt a more gradual approach to establishing a free market economy, unlike the "shock therapy" which Poland has opted to use. The pace of the reform has been slow, as has been the case in most of Eastern Europe. Thus far, Czechoslovakia has met with some success in attracting foreign investment, primarily from Germany. Very little of this investment, however, has been directed toward the defense sector. This is somewhat ironic, Furthermore, Hungary's primary defense industry has been defense 20 electronics, which will be relatively easily transferable to civilian markets.
In addition, from an economic standpoint, Hungary's unemployment level is lower than both Poland and Czechoslovakia (about 6.5%), and its inflation rate is about half that of the other two countries. These factors, plus the fact that Hungary has adopted a totally free market approach to conversion will allow any displaced workers from the defense sector to be absorbed into the other sectors of the economy. In general, it is likely to be only a matter of a brief time before there is no identifiable separate defense industrial sector in Hungary.
CONVERSION PLANS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the serious question of the feasibility of converting defense facilities to civilian production, particularly in the current economic environment, there has been some examination of the conversion prospects for some of the defense industry. This has come to be regarded as virtually Fourth, conversion must be need-driven, not capacity-driven.
One of the temptations in pursuing a conversion stiategy is to determine the uses to which defense-production facilities can be applied without first determining societal needs. It is one of the key reasons why so many past conversion attempts have proved to be futile. Ironically, Slovakia regards continued arms production as one of these sources, and the question arises as to whether this decision will make it that much more difficult for the country to wean itself away from defense production.
Sixth, the preferable way of utilizing defense facilities is not to simply convert the manufacturing capacity to some civilian use, but to permit outside entrepreneurs to start entirely new business, using the former defense facilities if necessary. This constitutes the model of "substitution," which entails the twostep process of shedding defense assets and encouraging the absorption of labor and capital by newly created companies. The conversion process will be more difficult for the producers of ground weapons than for either aircraft manufacturers or producers of electronics, since civilian markets for the latter two will likely be more easily located. The technological adjustments needed for producers of ground weapons to adapt to the production of civilian goods are far more extensive than those required in the other two fields.
In fact,
